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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990710-C A 
v. : 
CHAMNAPIN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503(3)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997) (in Add. A).1 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly find that entry of a guilty plea constituted 
"convicted" so as to make defendant a restricted person under Utah's firearm statute? 
'The statute was amended in 1999. Those amendments are not relevant to this 
case. The State will cite to the version in effect in January 1998, when the offense 
occurred. 
This issue presents a matter of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. Dominguez. 1999 
UT App 343, f 6, 992 P.2d 995; State v. Krueger. 1999 UT App 54, f 10, 975 P.2d 489, 
cert, granted. 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999). 
2. Is Utah's statute dealing with possession of a firearm by a restricted person 
unconstitutionally vague for unambiguously prohibiting the purchase, possession or 
transfer of firearms by someone who has been convicted of a felony? 
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, the appellate court presumes that 
the statute is constitutional. State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, f 8, 989 P.2d 503; 
Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ^[21. Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the 
unconstitutionality of a statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, 
| 8 ; Krueger. 1999 UT App 54, f21. A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a 
question of law which is reviewed on appeal for correctness. State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, 
f 6, 980 P.2d 191; Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, f 8. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1997) 
18U.S.C.S. §922. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Tiny Oriental Posse (TOP) and Oriental Laotian Gangsters (OLG) are two gangs 
active in West Valley City (R. 345:94-98).3 Both groups are composed of Asians, but 
TOP is predominantly Cambodians, while OLG is predominantly Laotians (R. 345:98). 
Whenever one of these gangs commits an offense against the other, the response is 
"especially heavy" retaliation (R. 345:104). Defendant is a long-time member of TOP (R. 
345:101). 
In October 1997, defendant was involved in a drive-by shooting in West Valley 
City (R. 345:102-03). While he drove the car past the Lake Park Apartments, someone in 
the car shot at Sokom Wren,4 an OLG member, hitting him in the stomach (R. 345:103; 
state's exh. 1, p. 2). Defendant was certified from juvenile court to district court on this 
crime and, on January 23,1998, pled guilty to discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a 
third degree felony (R. 25-26; 343:9; state's exh. 1, p. 1; state's exh. 2). Sentencing was 
set for August 7,1998 (R. 124). As part of defendant's pre-sentencing release, the court 
2The "statement of the case" and "statement of facts" are presented together 
because the information relevant to each is brief and intertwined. 
3Citation herein to transcripts will be to the volume number stamped on the cover 
of each transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 345: 
7. 
4Detective Black could not remember if the victim was Sokom Wren or his brother 
Sokam Wren (R. 345:103-04). The original presentence investigation report names as the 
victim "Sokhom Ren" (R. 002: presentence investigation report, pp. 3-4). 
3 
ordered that defendant have no contact with any members of TOP or OLG and that he be 
home by 6:00 p.m. (R. 345:6). 
On January 30, 1998—a week after entering his plea on the drive-by 
shooting—defendant and other members of TOP were at West Valley Billiards shortly 
before 10:30 p.m. when several OLG members entered and started shooting (R. 345:105, 
119, 126-27). Defendant fired back (R. 345:127). Several of defendant's friends were 
shot, and defendant went with them to a nearby hospital (R. 345:116, 208). 
Detective Craig Black helped with the investigation (R. 345:116, 125). Shortly 
after the gunplay, his investigation led him to the Pioneer Valley Hospital, where he 
found defendant and several other members of TOP in the waiting room while two of 
their group were being treated for gunshot wounds (R. 345:116). Another officer had 
located defendant's car in the parking lot and noticed a "mound" under the mat on the 
floor of the front passenger compartment (R. 345:117-18). Detective Black's experience 
with gangs and violent crime made him suspect that the mound was a gun (R. 345:118). 
Detective Black then spoke with defendant in an area away from the hearing of the 
remaining TOP members (R. 345:119). When faced with the Detective's suspicion, 
defendant admitted that it was a gun and gave police permission to seize it (R. 345:120-
24). Its caliber matched casings found near the pool tables at the crime scene (R. 
345:109-10, 124,135). Defendant also admitted that he had shot back at the aggressors 
4 
(R. 345:127). Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 4-5; 345:126). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The trial court properly found that upon entry of his guilty plea, defendant 
was "convicted" for purposes of section 76-10-503(3)(i), which prohibits a person 
convicted of a felony from possessing a handgun. Viewing the statute in its entirety, both 
the legislature's choice of text and the context in which the term "convicted" is used 
make it apparent that "convicted" means the establishment of guilt by verdict or plea. 
Utah case law supports the use of this common definition of "convicted," as does federal 
case law interpreting the parallel federal firearm statute. To hold otherwise would render 
the statute internally inconsistent and would violate the purpose of subsection (3) of the 
statute, which is to protect the public from those who represent a threat to public safety. 
Point II: Defendant fails to meet his burden of establishing that section 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i) *s unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. The term "convicted," in the 
context of the statute, provides a "reasonable degree of common understanding" 
concerning its meaning so as to avoid being void for vagueness. There is only one 
reasonable interpretation of the term in the context of the statute, and, once defined, the 
statute's application is automatic, leaving no room for arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement. Accordingly, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS "CONVICTED" UPON ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE PROHIBITING A PERSON CONVICTED 
OF A FELONY FROM POSSESSING A HANDGUN 
One week after pleading guilty to a third degree felony, but before sentencing on 
that plea, defendant not only had in his possession but used a hand gun. He was 
convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997), which provides: 
A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun described in this part 
who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
Defendant claims that he could not be a "restricted person" for purposes of section 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i) until he had been sentenced. Specifically, he contends that until he is 
sentenced, he is not "convicted" as required by the statute.5 Br. of Aplt. at 8-20. 
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is "to give effect to the legislature's 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 
UT App 56, f 14,975 P.2d 481. "[T]he best evidence of legislative intent is the plain 
language of the statute." Id. (quotations omitted). "[W]here the statutory language is 
The trial court's ruling to the contrary is attached in Addendum B. 
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plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine 
legislative intent." Lvon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19, f 17, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (quotations 
omitted). "'It is presumed that a statute is valid and i i.i nd phrases used were 
chosen carefully and advisedly.'" State v. EwelL 883 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990)). 
The statute's plain language must be read as a "comprehensive whole," and its provisions 
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute fhiele. 1999 UT App. 
56, f 14; see also Lyon, 2001 l l ' l 19, % 17. Meaning must be given to all provisions in the 
statute. Thiele, 19yy L ! App. 56, f 14. The statutory language "should be interpreted 
and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning 
results in an application that is neither unreasonably on i usee! inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." Hansen v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 931, 
934 (Utah App. 1998) (quotations omitted). "In order to give the statute the 
implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention,,, sometimes prevail over 
technically applied literalness." State v. Serpente, 768 F M 994, 995 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quotation omitted). 
Moreover, state statute provides that: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this code, 
any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law . . . . 
7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1996). 
The argument in this case focuses on the interpretation of the word "convicted." 
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the term "conviction" has a common 
and a more technical meaning. "Previous cases have acknowledged that in the legal 
context, there are two common meanings for 'conviction': one which denotes the 
establishment of 'guilty by verdict or plea' and one which refers to 'the final judgment 
entered on the plea or verdict.'" State v. Hunt 906 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1995) (holding 
that "conviction" for sentence enhancement purposes under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1 )(b) did not require entry of judgment and sentence) (quoting State v. Duncan. 812 
P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.) (holding that "conviction" for impeachment purposes under Utah 
R. Evidence 609(a)(1) meant a judgment of conviction because the sentencing 
determination reflected the final seriousness of the act)), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991); see also Ewell, 883 P.2d at 1364 n.l (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing cases 
supporting each meaning of "conviction"). See also Ewell, 883 P.2d at 1363 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) ("conviction" for Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) refers to establishment of 
guilt and not sentencing), and at 1365 (Bench, J., dissenting) (opining that "conviction" in 
section 76-3-203(4) referred to entry of judgment and sentence).6 
6Defendant seeks application of the definition of "conviction" found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-9(3) (1995). Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. That section provides: "judgment by a 
criminal court on a verdict or finding of guilty after trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo 
contendere." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(3). However, merely pointing to a different, 
unrelated title of the Code does not establish that the definition applies here, as different 
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A. Prior interpretation of Section 76-10-503 Supports the Definition of Guiit by 
Entry of a Plea or Verdict 
The choice of which definition applies turns on "the context and the purpose 
within which the term 'conviction' is used." Hunt, 906 P ? at 313 (quotations omitted). 
Generally, the same words within a statute should be given the same meaning unless there 
is a contrary legislative intent clearly expressed. State v. Oehlerking. 709 P.2d 900, 902 
(Ariz. App. 1985). In this case, the statute uses the term "convicted" twice: 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the 
laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, or 
country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been 
declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-10-501. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer an> haiulgu n described 
in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
Utah Code Ann. § 7"(> 1 (I- 503 (emphasis added), I )se ot I he lerm "convicted" in 
subsection (3)(a)(i) has not been addressed by Utah courts to date. However, this Court 
has addressed the term as used in subsection (l)(a). 
definitions apply to different titles. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(g) (1998) 
("'Conviction' means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury or bench, or plea, 
whether guilty or no contest, for any offense proscribed by Title 58 ")• 
9 
In State v. Gum 904 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1995), the trial court found defendant 
guilty of possessing a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Id. at 240. The basis for 
the charge was defendant's prior guilty plea to third degree felony burglary. Id. On 
appeal, defendant argued that he was not restricted for purposes of subsection (l)(a) 
because, although he had pled guilty to a felony, the trial court sentenced him as though 
he had been convicted of a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to section 76-3-402. Id. at 
243. This Court rejected defendant's argument, holding "that those restricted from 
possessing dangerous weapons for the purposes of section 76-10-503 are restricted once 
they have been convicted of one or more of the statute's enumerated offenses regardless 
of how the crime was classified and regardless of the sentence imposed." (emphasis 
added). Id. at 244. Accordingly, the Court gave "convicted" its ordinary and popular 
meaning: the finding of guilt by plea or verdict. See State v. Wagenius. 581 P.2d 319, 
323 (Idaho 1978). 
B. Statutory Intent Requires that "Convicted" be Defined as Guilt bv Entry of a 
Plea or Verdict 
Also helpful is the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hunt. In Hunt, defendant 
was charged in the same information with three counts of distributing marijuana. State v. 
Hunt. 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995). The sentencing enhancement statute elevated a 
third degree felony to a second degree felony upon "a second or subsequent conviction." 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b) (1994). Defendant argued that the offenses resulting in 
the "second or subsequent conviction" must occur after entry of a judgment of conviction 
10 
on the first offense in order for the penalty to be increased. Hunt, 906 P.2d at 312. "A 
judgment of conviction includes 'the plea or verdict, if any, and the sentence.'" Id. at 313 
(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)). The Court, however, held that the first conviction did 
not require entry of a judgment and sentence. Id. at . The Court noted that under 
defendant's reasoning he "could commit an offense, be charged for that offense, and 
commit another offense while the charges were pending without being subject to the 
enhancement provision. Even if the defendant sold narcotics outside the courthouse 
while awaiting the return of a verdict on the first charge, that crime would not qualify for 
enhancement umk-i Hunt's formulation of the statute." Id. at 313. The Court found that 
this was not intended under the statute. 
The same reasoning applies here. Defendant's interpretation wnuld permit him to 
lawfully "purchase, possess, ui transfer'' J handgun dining the entire time between entry 
of his guilty pit <i ind sentencing, regardless of the length of delay between the two. That 
this was not intended by the legislature is clear from the face of the statute. 
While subsection (3)(a) is drafted to apply solely 10 handguns, n is drafted with a 
broad brush to include numnoti s au.t?ories of people deemed too dangerous to entrust 
with handguns. Those categories include individuals "under indictment." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(ii). This language makes it clear that it is nol tin; entry oi a 
judgment and sentence that renders the individual too dangerous to entrust with a gun: it 
is the existence of soi * such as mere probable cause to believe he committed 
11 
an indictable offense. If one who has been indicted cannot possess a handgun while he 
awaits trial, it makes no sense to treat any differently someone who has in fact pled guilty 
to a felony offense and is merely awaiting sentencing. 
C. Parallel Federal Authority Requires that "Convicted" be Defined as Guilt by 
Entry of a Plea or Verdict 
Finally, federal courts have also defined "conviction" to mean entry of guilty pleas 
when dealing with the federal counterpart to section 76-10-503. 18 U.S.C.S. § 922 (in 
Add. C). The federal counterpart includes both the "convicted" and "indictment" 
alternatives present in the state statute. IdL at § 922(h). That provision provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person -
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
To receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id. Because the federal law parallels Utahfs law, federal cases interpreting the federal law 
may be viewed as persuasive authority. See, e.g.. State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 
(Utah 1986); State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Chavez. 
840 P.2d 846, 848 n.l (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
In United States v. Rosenstengel. 323 F.Supp. 499 (E.D. Mo. 1971), the defendant 
was convicted under the federal law. He appealed, arguing that he could not be a 
"convicted felon" under the federal statute because, although he had originally pled guilty 
12 
to a felony, he had not been sentenced at the time he was found to have acquired the 
firearm. Id. at 500. Defendant cited Missouri cases requiring a final judgment and 
sentencing before he could be deemed "convicted." Id. at 500-01. However, the federal 
court stated that these interpretations of "conviction" wei e statute-specific, and held that 
even if defendant had been acquitted of his felony, he was a restricted person for 
purposes of the federal statute so long as he was "under indictment," including 
information. Id, The court stated: 
In view of the evident intent of Congress, there is no doubt in our mind that the 
word "convicted" was used in the statute in its broadest sense. To narrowly equate 
the term "convicted" with a final judgment of conviction thereafter entered would 
clearly frustrate the Congressional purpose, evidenced, inter alia, by the very fact 
that a firearm may not be sold. . . to [or possessed by] a person under indictment.. 
. . . [C]ertainly Congress was aware that the federal courts have consistently held 
that a plea of guilty is itself a conviction. 
Id. at 0^1 -l»2 (emphasis .itMeili 
Other federal cases have also found that guilty pleas are sufficient to constitute 
"convictions" for purposes of the federal firearm statute. See United States v. Faison. bi 
F.3d 22, 23 (11th Cir. i WS1 (a \ adiel lacking Ibrmal judgment is a "conviction" for 
federal liroarm sunne purposes), cert, denied. 516 U.S. 1059 (1996); United States v. 
Dougherty. 895 F.2d 399,403 (7th Cir. 1990) G'ury verdict of guilty amounted to being 
"convicted by a court" for purposes of federal offense of being a convicted felon in 
13 
possession of a firearm, even though no formal judgment of conviction was entered on 
the verdict). 
The legislature's choice of the word "convicted", together with the context in 
which it is used, the overall purpose of the subsection as revealed by the plain language of 
the statute, and the case authority, supports the determination that "convicted" means the 
establishment of guilt by verdict or plea. Any other definition would unreasonably 
restrict the application of the statute and would defeat the legislative purpose of 
protecting the public from potentially dangerous individuals carrying guns. 
POINT II 
THE TERM "CONVICTED" IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 76-10-
503(3)(A)(I) PROVIDES A "REASONABLE DEGREE OF COMMON 
UNDERSTANDING" SUFFICIENT TO AVOID BEING 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND THE STATUTE DOES NOT 
ALLOW FOR ARBITRARY OR DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT 
Defendant contends that if the term "convicted" in section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) is 
interpreted as meaning anything other than entry of a final judgment and sentence, the 
statute suffers from a fatal ambiguity.7 Specifically, he argues that the statute would be 
unconstitutionally vague because: 1) it would not give fair notice to those entering pleas 
that they would be restricted persons under the statute; 2) it would not guard against 
7The trial court's ruling to the contrary is attached in Addendum B. 
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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; and 3) it would unconstitutionally inhibit the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms. Br. of Aplt. at 20-29.8 
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute, the appellate cuini 
presumes that the statute is valid and resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constituticmality. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f6, 980 P.2d 191; Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 
935 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah App. 1997). The void-for vagueness doctrine requires that a 
statute "define the criminal offense with sufficient deflniteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited ami in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and disci iminatoi y enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357,103 S. Ct. 
1855, 1858 (1983): see also Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake, K! P 2d Mo, sl</ 
(Utah 1991). More important than the actual notice requo email is the: requirement that 
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.'" Kolender. 461 
U.S at 358, 10 * S ( L at 1858 (quoting Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S. Ct. 
1242, 1247-48 (1974)); Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819. Challengers of the application of a 
law to their own conduct must demonstrate, beyond a i easonable doubt, "either that the 
[statute] does not pr<n nk1 llitin idequate notice or that the [statute] could be arbitrarily 
Defendant does not indicate whether he challenges the statute on its face or in its 
application. To challenge the statute on its face, defendant must show that it is incapable 
of any valid application. Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 
1991). However, as argued herein, the statute is valid as applied to defendant. See Point 
II. Accordingly, this Court need only review the statute as applied to defendant to 
determine its constitutionality. 
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enforced against them.'1 Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 820; see also State v. Shepherd, 1999 
UT App 305^19, 18. 
A. The Statute Provides Adequate Notice of When an Individual is Deemed to be 
a Restricted Person 
Defendant contends that because the term "convicted" is not adequately defined in 
the statute, he was not provided adequate notice of the applicability of the statute with 
which to guide his decision on whether to enter a plea. Br. of Aplt. at 23-26. However, 
the failure to define a statutory term is not necessarily fatal to a statute. Shepherd, 1999 
UT App 305, f 10 (statute upheld absent definition of the term "public offering"); see also 
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1981) (upholding statute absent definition of 
"gross deviation"); State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, f 24, 975 P.2d 489 (finding 
adequate notice of prohibited conduct where statute failed to define "delinquent"), cert, 
granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999). Neither "absolute exactitude of expression" nor 
"complete precision" are required. Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183. Further, the meaning of 
"convicted" within the context of the statute is sufficiently defined to give defendant 
notice of his restricted status. 
Defendant first argues that if the term "convicted" in section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) is 
defined as being the establishment of guilt by a verdict or guilty plea rather than a 
judgment of conviction, then the statute is unconstitutionally vague and therefore violates 
due process of law because an ordinary person would not understand that he was a 
restricted person as of the entry of his guilty plea and would not know if he continued to 
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be restricted upon withdrawal of the plea or entry of a judgment for a lesser degree of 
offense. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. 
This statute, while perhaps strict, is not so vague as to make persons of ordinary 
intelligence guess at whether they are comporting with its requirements. The challenged 
term is a narrow one defined in one of two ways: 1) more commonly, the establishment of 
guilt by verdict or plea; and 2) more technically, the final judgment entered on a plea or 
verdict. Hunt. 906 P.2d at 313. Which definition applies depends upon "the context and 
the purpose within which the term 'conviction' is used." LI (quotation omitted). The 
context within which the term "convicted" is used in the challenged subsection readily 
demonstrates that there is a "reasonable degree of common understanding" of what the 
language of the subsection means. Shepherd. 1999 UT App. 305, ^ f 10 (quotation 
omitted). Review of the entire subsection provides a person of ordinary intelligence with 
notice that a person "under indictment," without more, is clearly a restricted person. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10r503(3)(a)(ii). This strongly suggests that someone admitting guilt to a 
felony in a court of law would similarly be restricted from the time the admission is 
accepted by the court. To presume otherwise would be unreasonable. 
The question of what happens if the plea is later withdrawn or a judgment is 
entered for a misdemeanor offense is irrelevant to the constitutional issue raised in this 
case. First, it did not happen in this case: judgment was entered and sentence imposed on 
defendant for the felony to which he pled (R. 002 presentence investigation addendum, p. 
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5). Second, the statute covers such transitional periods by recognizing that an 
individual's legal status may change, but that the individual is restricted until the change 
occurs. This reasoning necessarily applies to the subsection announcing the restricted 
status of a person under indictment: once under indictment, the person is restricted 
regardless of the outcome of any future trial or plea proceedings. See Rosenstengeh 323 
F.Supp. at 500-01. The same reasoning applies to those who have become legal citizens, 
had their records expunged, or freed themselves of drug addiction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503(3)(a)(iii), (iv), (vi), & (viii). Hence, the same reasoning was likely intended to 
apply to determine the restricted status of a convicted felon. Regardless of what might 
ultimately happen to the plea, it would not change the fact that the statute provides notice 
that a person entering a guilty plea to a felony is restricted from the time the plea is 
entered until the time the plea is somehow altered. 
Under the facts of this case, the statute gives fair notice to persons of ordinary 
intelligence entering guilty pleas to felony offenses that they are restricted persons from 
the time they admit their guilt in court. Any other interpretation would thwart the 
statute's purpose of protecting society from individuals identified to be risks to society. 
Accordingly, defendant's first argument concerning constitutional vagueness fails. 
B. The Statute Does not Permit Arbitrary or Discriminatory Enforcement 
Defendant argues that the statute fails to adequately guard against arbitrary and 
discriminatory application, rendering it unconstitutionally vague. Br. of Aplt. at 26-28. 
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First, he argues that the existence of two common interpretations of "convicted" 
permits any judge to discriminate against classes of individuals by selectively applying in 
any given case the definition that best suits that judge's unconstitutional discriminatory 
goal. Id. at 26. Contrary to defendant's claim, the statute provides sufficient standards 
for application of the restricted person status: conviction of the accused. The term 
"convicted" was intentionally used by the legislature and is susceptible of only one 
reasonable interpretation within the context of the subsection-entry of a verdict or 
plea-leaving no room for arbitrary enforcement by the courts (see Point I, supra). Use of 
the term does not vest unlimited enforcement discretion in anyone. Where the term is 
susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, administration of the statute is not only 
wholly non-arbitrary, but is automatic and consistent in all cases. Further, there is no 
basis for defendant's presumption that a given judge would define "convicted" differently 
in different cases to support a discriminatory motive. 
Second, defendant makes the related claim that the legislature has set up such a 
broad statute that it is up to the judiciary to narrow it by selectively and arbitrarily 
applying and enforcing the statute, which can be done differently in different cases at the 
whim of the judiciary. Br. of Aplt. at 27-28. Again, the statute is narrowly constructed, 
judicial interpretation narrowly construes the challenged term, and the term is susceptible 
of only one reasonable interpretation within the context of the subsection. See Point I, 
19 
supra. Once defined, the prohibition either applies in a case or does not, without the 
exercise of any discretion by the individual judge. 
Finally, defendant claims that the statute encourages manipulation by defendants 
by giving them the option of foregoing or withdrawing an otherwise beneficial guilty plea 
in order to maintain possession of a firearm. Br. of Aplt. at 28. This is exactly what the 
vagueness laws allow for. The purpose of such laws is to ensure that a criminal violation 
is described sufficiently to allow persons of ordinary intelligence to adjust their actions to 
avoid application of the criminal statute. Owens* 638 P.2d at 1183 ("[A] criminal 
violation should be described with sufficient certainty so that persons of ordinary 
intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern themselves in conformity 
with it."); Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, f 10 ("statutes must contain sufficient certainty to 
permit conformance to law"); see also Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104,108, 
92 S. Ct. 2294,2298-99 (1972) (laws must give a "person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly"). The 
challenged statute permits a defendant to avoid becoming a restricted person by acting in 
such a way as to avoid being "convicted" of a felony, i.e., avoid entry of a verdict or plea 
against him. In so doing, defendant must necessarily determine for himself the most 
"beneficial" action to take-entering the plea or rejecting it in order to remain in 
possession of a firearm. Whether the statute in question is beneficial is not an inquiry for 
the courts. Trade Common v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1968). 
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Courts are only concerned with whether the statute is constitutional. If the decision is a 
difficult one for a defendant, so be it. Defendants are not entitled to plea bargains and are 
free to reject them for any reason. Requiring a defendant to make such a choice does not 
render the statute unconstitutionally vague for failure to prevent arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement against defendants. 
C The Statute Does Not Unduiv Inhibit a Constitutionally Protected Freedom 
Defendant includes in his analysis a third consideration: "whether the statute 
inhibits the exercise of 'basic First Amendment freedoms/" Br. of Aplt. at 28-29 (quoting 
Gravned. 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S. Ct at 2294). He argues that the challenged statute 
unconstitutionally interferes with the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 
Br. of Aplt. at 28-29. This argument is not persuasive. 
First, defendant does not assert any impact on a First Amendment right, as called 
for by the authority upon which he relies. Gravned, 408 U.S. at 108-09,92 S. Ct. at 2294. 
Second, to the extent the vagueness doctrine includes a review of a statute's impact 
on constitutionally protected activity, the statute does not unconstitutionally interfere with 
the right to keep and bear arms. Instead, it impacts on the right only to the degree 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute: to protect the public from individuals 
who are dangerous to society. One who has pled guilty to a felony is far more dangerous 
to society then someone who has not committed a crime, and is equally, if not more, 
dangerous to society than someone who has been indicted, whose rights are equally 
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restricted under the statute.9 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(ii). The challenged 
subsection limits that right only in well-defined circumstances-upon entry of a verdict or 
guilty plea. Accordingly, absent defendant's ability to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt the inadequate notice or the absence of enforcement guidelines required by the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine, the limited impact the challenged subsection has on a 
convicted felon's right to keep and bear arms is insufficient ground for finding the statute 
to be constitutionally vague. 
Because defendant has made no showing, either legally or factually, to support his 
contention that the language of the challenged statute is subject to differing ambiguous 
interpretations or makes possible arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, the statute is 
not unconstitutionally vague or violative of due process, and his claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f ? day of August, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
IS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
9Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of subsection 503(3)(a)(ii) 
involving the restricted status of one under indictment. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1997 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1995 EDITION 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as denned in 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
History: C. 1963,76-10-503, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, * 76-10-603; 1977, ch. 82, 5 1; 
1986, ch. 210, ft 1; 1990, ch. 160, ft 1; 1991, 
ch.l7,ft l;1991,ch.87,ft 6; 1993, ch. 62, ft 2; 
1994, ch. 19, ft 2; 1994, ch. 149, ft 2; 1997, ch. 
289, ft 12. 
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1 I mean I don't think that's held anymore and I think that 
2 there's an enormous number of Federal crimes that are death 
3 penalty crimes that clearly would not fall under Federal 
4 crime if we were talking in terms of the old federalism 
5 concept. 
6 But that is there and once you're raised to a 
7 Federal level, you really are in a greater arena. It is a 
8 greater evil or the State should be allowed to regulate it 
9 so I think that/ you know, you can make too little of the 
10 jurisdictional element there. 
11 I would submit it on that, you Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, thanks. 
13 This has been an interesting argument and a 
14 bunch of cases to read, in fact, most of them, I ended up 
15 reading twice because a lot of them I read before the last 
16 hearing and by the time I got home last night, I realized I 
17 had forgotten them. So, I had to read them again. 
18 I appreciate the fact that both of you have been 
19 good enough to point out not only what's in your favor but 
20 what's not in your favor and point out the flaws in your 
21 arguments because it makes it more helpful to me to know 
22 the full picture. 
23 And I guess although I don't usually like being 
24 the first one to have to do something that's probably going 
25 to be appealed, I guess that's what happens. So in spite 
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1 of that, I have enjoyed reading the memos and the cases, I 
2 guess that's what I wanted to say, 
3 In terms of the motions, I think as I reviewed 
4 the cases that I'm more persuaded that what's referred to 
5 as the common definition of conviction is the one that's 
6 appropriate for the Court to use in this case and that is, 
7 that conviction means when a jury verdict is returned or a 
8 judge receives a guilty plea. I think there certainly is, 
9 what I understand to be the technical aspect of the process 
10 which is the entry of the judgment and conviction, but I 
11 think in assessing all of the cases, as I did, it seemed to 
12 me that the better reasoning in the cases and the cases 
13 that were more consistent with the issue that we're dealing 
14 with here, the cases construed a plea to equal a 
15 conviction. And so, in terms of the defendant's motion to 
16 quash, I'm going to deny that because I do believe that the 
17 statute, the wording in the statute refers to conviction 
18 meaning when a guilty plea is received by a judge. 
19 For pretty much the same reason, I don't find the 
20 statute to be unconstitutionally vague. I think the 
21 statute is clear, is capable of being understood by persons 
22 of ordinary intelligence. I think it does give people 
23 clear direction as to what conduct is prohibited and what 
24 classes of individuals are restricted from having fire 
25 arms, so I do find— or I don't find, rather, that the 
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statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
It's been an interesting exercise as I said and I 
appreciated reading all the cases. There were lots of 
them. 
Do you want to go ahead to your other motions? 
MR. STEELE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, what's next. 
MR. STEELE: The— there's one more. 
THE COURT: Alright, the motion to suppress? 
Okay? And I'll just let you know also that I reviewed my 
notes that I took when Officer Black testified but feel 
free to refresh my recollection. 
MR. STEELE: What would be the best way to proceed 
on that? 
THE COURT: Well, you broke your memo down, or 
your motion down into three areas and I'd be happy if you 
want to just follow that outline. That's kind of what I 
was looking at as I reviewed everything last night. 
I guess if you want me to point out the areas 
that I had some questions about. In the first area, the 
right to counsel, I guess my questions would focus around, 
is this a closely related matter as the cases have talked 
about. That would be my focus there. And then I can let 
you know the others when you get there. 
MR. STEELE: Okay. And I certainly understand 
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Addendum C 
t 922. Unlawful acts 
a) It shall be unlawful— 
(1) for any person— 
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed 
dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or deal-
ing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or 
receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(B) except a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer, to engage in 
the business of importing or manufacturing ammunition, or in the 
course of such business, to ship, transport, or receive any ammunition 
in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(2) for any importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector licensed under the 
provisions of this chapter |18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.J to ship or transport 
in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm to any person other than a 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed col-
lector, except that— 
(A) this paragraph and subsection (b)(3) shall not be held to preclude 
a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector from returning a firearm or replacement firearm of the same 
kind and type to a person from whom it was received; and this 
paragraph shall not be held to preclude an individual from mailing a 
firearm owned in compliance with Federal, State, and local law to a 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector; 
(B) this paragraph shall not be held to preclude a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer from depositing a firearm for 
conveyance in the mails to any officer, employee, agent, or watchman 
who, pursuant to the provisions of section 1715 of this title, is eligible 
to receive through the mails pistols, revolvers, and other firearms 
capable of being concealed on the person, for use in connection with his 
official duty; and 
(C) nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as applying in any 
manner in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, or any possession of the United States differently than it would 
apply if the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
or the possession were in fact a State of the United States; 
(3) for any person other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport into or receive in the 
State where he resides (or if the person is a corporation or other business 
entity, the State where it maintains a place of business) any firearm 
purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State, except 
that this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully 
acquires a firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State other than 
his State of residence from transporting the firearm into or receiving it in 
that State, if it is lawful for such person to purchase or possess such 
firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the transportation or receipt 
of a firearm obtained in conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, 
and (C) shall not apply to the transportation of any firearm acquired in 
any State prior to the effective date of this chapter [effective Dec. 16, 
1%8|; 
(4) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
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licensed dealer, or licensed collector, to transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in section 5845 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 5845]), short-barreled 
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized by the 
Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity; 
(5) for any person (other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector) to transfer, sell, trade, give, trans-
port, or deliver any firearm to any person (other than a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector) who the 
transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in (or 
if the person is a corporation or other business entity, does not maintain 
a place of business in) the State in which the transferor resides; except 
that this paragraph shall not apply to (A) the transfer, transportation, or 
delivery of a firearm made to carry out a bequest of a firearm to, or an 
acquisition by intestate succession of a firearm by, a person who is permit-
ted to acquire or possess a firearm under the laws of the State of his resi-
dence, and (B) the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary 
use for lawful sporting purposes; 
(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisi-
tion of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make 
any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any 
false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to 
deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector with respect to 
any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such 
firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter [18 USCS 
§§921etseq.[ ; 
(7) for any person to manufacture or import armor piercing ammunition, 
except that this paragraph shall not apply to— 
(A) the manufacture or importation of such ammunition for the use of 
the United States or any department or agency thereof or any State or 
any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; 
(B) the manufacture of such ammunition for the purpose of exporta-
tion; and 
(C) any manufacture or importation for the purposes of testing or 
experimentation authorized by the Secretary; 
(8) for any manufacturer or importer to sell or deliver armor piercing 
ammunition, except that this paragraph shall not apply to— 
(A) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for use of the United States or any department or agency thereof 
or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; 
(B) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for the purpose of exportation; 
(C) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for the purposes of testing or experimenting authorized by the 
Secretary; and 
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(9) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector, who does not reside in any State to 
receive any firearms unless such receipt is for lawful sporting purposes. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver— 
(1) any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee knows 
or has reasonable cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age, and, 
if the firearm, or ammunition is other than a shotgun or rifle, or ammu-
nition for a shotgun or rifle, to any individual who the licensee knows or 
has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age; 
(2) any firearm to any person in any State where the purchase or posses-
sion by such person of such firearm would be in violation of any State law 
or any published ordinance applicable at the place of sale, delivery or 
other disposition, unless the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to 
believe that the purchase or possession would not be in violation of such 
State law or such published ordinance; 
(3) any firearm to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable 
cause to believe does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or 
other business entity, does not maintain a place of business in) the State 
in which the licensee's place of business is located, except that this 
paragraph (A) shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or shotgun 
to a resident of a State other than a State in which the licensee's place of 
business is located if the transferee meets in person with the transferor to 
accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and receipt fully comply 
with the legal conditions of sale in both such States (and any licensed 
manufacturer, importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of this 
subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had 
actual knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of both 
States), and (B) shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any 
person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes; 
(4) to any person any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in sec-
tion 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 |26 USCS § 5845J), short-
barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized 
by the Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity; and 
(5) any firearm or armor-piercing ammunition to any person unless the 
licensee notes in his records, required to be kept pursuant to section 923 
of this chapter, the name, age, and place of residence of such person if the 
person is an individual, or the identity and principal and local places of 
business of such person if the person is a corporation or other business 
entity. 
Paragraphs (I), (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection shall not apply to transac-
tions between licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, 
and licensed collectors. Paragraph (4) of this subsection shall not apply to a 
sale or delivery to any research organization designated by the Secretary. 
(c) In any case not otherwise prohibited by this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et 
seq.|, a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer may sell 
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a firearm to a person who does not appear in person at the licensee's busi-
ness premises (other than another licensed importer, manufacturer, or 
dealer) only if— 
(1) the transferee submits to the transferor a sworn statement in the fol-
lowing form: 
"Subject to penalties provided by law, I swear that, in the case of any 
firearm other than a shotgun or a rifle, I am twenty-one years or more 
of age, or that, in the case of a shotgun or a rifle, I am eighteen years 
or more of age; that I am not prohibited by the provisions of chapter 
44 of title 18, United States Code (18 USCS §§921 et seq.], from 
receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce; and that my 
receipt of this firearm will not be in violation of any statute of the State 
and published ordinance applicable to the locality in which I reside. 
Further, the true title, name, and address of the principal law enforce-
ment officer of the locality to which the firearm will be delivered are 
Signature Date " 
and containing blank spaces for the attachment of a true copy of any 
permit or other information required pursuant to such statute or published 
ordinance; 
(2) the transferor has, prior to the shipment or delivery of the firearm, 
forwarded by registered or certified mail (return receipt requested) a copy 
of the sworn statement, together with a description of the firearm, in a 
form prescribed by the Secretary, to the chief law enforcement officer of 
the transferee's place of residence, and has received a return receipt 
evidencing delivery of the statement or has had the statement returned 
due to the refusal of the named addressee to accept such letter in accor-
dance with United States Post Office Department [United States Postal 
Service] regulations; and 
(3) the transferor has delayed shipment or delivery for a period of at least 
seven days following receipt of the notification of the acceptance or refusal 
of delivery of the statement. 
A copy of the sworn statement and a copy of the notification to the local law 
enforcement officer, together with evidence of receipt or rejection of that 
notification shall be retained by the licensee as a part of the records required 
to be kept under section 923(g). 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any 
firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that such person— 
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
(2) is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); 
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to 
any mental institution; 
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(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions; 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his 
citizenship; or 
(8) is subject to a court order that restrains such person from harassing, 
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of 
such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would 
place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner 
or child, except that this paragraph shall only apply to a court order 
that— 
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual 
notice, and at which such person had the opportunity to participate; 
and 
(B)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to 
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or 
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 
This subsection shall not apply with respect to the sale or disposition of a 
firearm or ammunition to a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector who pursuant to subsection (b) of sec-
tion 925 of this chapter is not precluded from dealing in firearms or ammu-
nition, or to a person who has been granted relief from disabilities pursuant 
to subsection (c) of section 925 of this chapter. 
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be 
delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment 
in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers, 
licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors, any package 
or other container in which there is any firearm or ammunition without 
written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being 
transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally pos-
sesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or 
contract carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign 
commerce may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the 
pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such common or contract carrier for 
the duration of the trip without violating any of the provisions of this chapter 
118 USCS §§ 921 et seq.|. No common or contract carrier shall require or 
cause any label, tag, or other written notice to be placed on the outside of 
any package, luggage, or other container that such package, luggage, or other 
container contains a firearm. 
(0(1) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to transport 
or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition 
with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the shipment, trans-
portation, or receipt thereof would be in violation of the provisions of this 
chapter 118 USCS §§ 921 et seq.]. 
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(2) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to deliver in 
interstate or foreign commerce any firearm without obtaining written 
acknowledgement of receipt from the recipient of the package or other 
container in which there is a firearm. 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person— 
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been com-
mitted to a mental institution; 
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions; 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his 
citizenship; or 
(8) who is subject to a court order that— 
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual 
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; 
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an 
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or 
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate 
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and 
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat 
to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or 
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or af-
fecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
(h) It shall be unlawful for any individual, who to that individuals knowl-
edge and while being employed for any person described in any paragraph 
of subsection (g) of this section, in the course of such employment— 
(1) to receive, possess, or transport any firearm or ammunition in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(2) to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(i) It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or ship in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm or ammunition was 
stolen. 
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(j) It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, possess, conceal, store, 
barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, or pledge 
or accept as security for a loan any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, 
which is moving as, which is a part of, which constitutes, or which has been 
shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, either before or 
after it was stolen, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
firearm or ammunition was stolen. 
(k) ft shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport, ship, or 
receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had the 
importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered, 
or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer's or 
manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at 
any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(I) Except as provided in section 925(d) of this chapter, it shall be unlawful 
for any person knowingly to import or bring into the United States or any 
possession thereof any firearm or ammunition; and it shall be unlawful for 
any person knowingly to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 
imported or brought into the United States or any possession thereof in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.]. 
(m) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector knowingly to make any false entry in, 
to fail to make appropriate entry in, or to fail to properly maintain, any rec-
ord which he is required to keep pursuant to section 923 of this chapter or 
regulations promulgated thereunder. 
(n) It shall be unlawful for any person who is under indictment for a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or 
transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition or 
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(o)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any 
person to transfer or possess a machinegun. 
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to— 
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the 
United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a 
department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or 
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was 
lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect [effective 
May 19, 1986]. 
(p)(l) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship, 
deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm— 
(A) that, after removal of grips, stocks, and magazines, is not as detect-
able as the Security Exemplar, by walk-through metal detectors cali-
brated and operated to detect the Security Exemplar; or 
(B) any major component of which, when subjected to inspection by 
the types of x-ray machines commonly used at airports, does not gener-
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ate an image that accurately depicts the shape of the component. 
Barium sulfate or other compounds may be used in the fabrication of 
the component. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) the term "firearm" does not include the frame or receiver of any 
such weapon; 
(B) the term "major component" means, with respect to a firearm, the 
barrel, the slide or cylinder, or the frame or receiver of the firearm; and 
(C) the term "Security Exemplar" means an object, to be fabricated at 
the direction of the Secretary, that is— 
(i) constructed of, during the 12-month period beginning on the date 
of the enactment of this subsection |enacted Nov. 10, 1988], 3.7 
ounces of material type 17-4 PH stainless steel in a shape resembling 
a handgun; and 
(ii) suitable for testing and calibrating metal detectors: 
Provided, however, That at the close of such 12-month period, and at ap-
propriate times thereafter the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to 
permit the manufacture, importation, sale, shipment, delivery, possession, 
transfer, or receipt of firearms previously prohibited under this subparagraph 
that are as detectable as a "Security Exemplar" which contains 3.7 ounces 
of material type 17-4 PH stainless steel, in a shape resembling a handgun, 
or such lesser amount as is detectable in view of advances in state-of-the-art 
developments in weapons detection technology. 
(3) Under such rules and regulations as the Secretary shall prescribe, this 
subsection shall not apply to the manufacture, possession, transfer, 
receipt, shipment, or delivery of a firearm by a licensed manufacturer or 
any person acting pursuant to a contract with a licensed manufacturer, for 
the purpose of examining and testing such firearm to determine whether 
paragraph (1) applies to such firearm. The Secretary shall ensure that rules 
and regulations adopted pursuant to this paragraph do not impair the 
manufacture of prototype firearms or the development of new technology. 
(4) The Secretary shall permit the conditional importation of a firearm by 
a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer, for examination and testing 
to determine whether or not the unconditional importation of such 
firearm would violate this subsection. 
(5) This subsection shall not apply to any firearm which— 
(A) has been certified by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of 
Central Intelligence, after consultation with the Secretary and the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, as necessary for 
military or intelligence applications; and 
(B) is manufactured for and sold exclusively to military or intelligence 
agencies of the United States. 
(6) This subsection shall not apply with respect to any firearm manufac-
tured in, imported into, or possessed in the United States before the date 
of the enactment of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 [enacted Nov. 
10, 1988|. 
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(q)( I) The Congress finds and declares that— 
(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, 
nationwide problem; 
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement 
of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs; 
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and 
have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as 
documented in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of 
the House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate; 
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component 
parts, ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made 
have considerably moved in interstate commerce; 
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens 
and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the 
country due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and 
parents may decline to send their children to school for the same rea-
son; 
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a 
decline in the quality of education in our country; 
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on 
interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States; 
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to 
handle gun-related crime by themselves; even States, localities, and 
school systems that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and 
punish gun-related crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the 
failure or inability of other States or localities to take strong measures; 
and 
(I) Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and other 
provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integ-
rity and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of this subsection. 
(2)(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to 
believe, is a school zone. 
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the possession of a firearm— 
(i) on private property not part of school grounds; 
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the 
State in which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of 
the State, and the law of the State or political subdivision requires 
that, before an individual obtain such a license, the law enforcement 
authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the indi-
vidual is qualified under law to receive the license; 
(iii) which is— 
(I) not loaded; and 
(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is on a 
motor vehicle; 
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(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in 
the school zone; 
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into be-
tween a school in the school zone and the individual or an employer 
of the individual; 
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capac-
ity; or 
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while travers-
ing school premises for the purpose of gaining access to public or 
private lands open to hunting, if the entry on school premises is au-
thorized by school authorities. 
(3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), it shall be unlawful for 
any person, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the safety of an-
other, to discharge or attempt to discharge a firearm at a place that the 
person knows is a school zone. 
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the discharge of a firearm— 
(i) on private property not part of school grounds; 
(ii) as part of a program approved by a school in the school zone, 
by an individual who is participating in the program; 
(iii) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into be-
tween a school in a school zone and the individual or an employer 
of the individual; or 
(iv) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capac-
ity. 
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as preempting or 
preventing a State or local government from enacting a statute establish-
ing gun-free school zones as provided in this subsection. 
(r) It shall be unlawful for any person to assemble from imported parts any 
semiautomatic rifle or any shotgun which is identical to any rifle or shotgun 
prohibited from importation under section 925(d)(3) of this chapter as not 
being particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes 
except that this subsection shall not apply to— 
(1) the assembly of any such rifle or shotgun for sale or distribution by a 
licensed manufacturer to the United States or any department or agency 
thereof or to any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision 
thereof; or 
(2) the assembly of any such rifle or shotgun for the purposes of testing 
or experimentation authorized by the Secretary. 
(s)(l) Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this subsection [enacted Nov. 30, 1993] and ending on the day before the 
date that is 60 months after such date of enactment, it shall be unlawful 
for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer to sell, 
deliver, or transfer a handgun (other than the return of a handgun to the 
person from whom it was received) to an individual who is not licensed 
under section 923, unless— 
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(A) after the most recent proposal of such transfer by the transferee— 
(i) the transferor has— 
(I) received from the transferee a statement of the transferee 
containing the information described in paragraph (3); 
(II) verified the identity of the transferee by examining the 
identification document presented; 
(III) within I day after the transferee furnishes the statement, 
provided notice of the contents of the statement to the chief law 
enforcement officer of the place of residence of the transferee; and 
(IV) within 1 day after the transferee furnishes the statement, 
transmitted a copy of the statement to the chief law enforcement 
officer of the place of residence of the transferee; and 
(ii) (I) 5 business days (meaning days on which State offices are open) 
have elapsed from the date the transferor furnished notice of the 
contents of the statement to the chief law enforcement officer, dur-
ing which period the transferor has not received information from 
the chief law enforcement officer that receipt or possession of the 
handgun by the transferee would be in violation of Federal, State, or 
local law; or 
(II) the transferor has received notice from the chief law enforce-
ment officer that the officer has no information indicating that 
receipt or possession of the handgun by the transferee would 
violate Federal, State, or local law; 
(B) the transferee has presented to the transferor a written statement, 
issued by the chief law enforcement officer of the place of residence of 
the transferee during the 10-day period ending on the date of the most 
recent proposal of such transfer by the transferee, stating that the 
transferee requires access to a handgun because of a threat to the life 
of the transferee or of any member of the household of the transferee; 
(C)(i) the transferee has presented to the transferor a permit that— 
(I) allows the transferee to possess or acquire a handgun; and 
(II) was issued not more than 5 years earlier by the State in which 
the transfer is to take place; and 
(ii) the law of the State provides that such a permit is to be issued 
only after an authorized government official has verified that the in-
formation available to such official does not indicate that possession 
of a handgun by the transferee would be in violation of the law; 
(D) the law of the State requires that, before any licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer completes the transfer of a 
handgun to an individual who is not licensed under section 923, an au-
thorized government official verify that the information available to 
such official does not indicate that possession of a handgun by the 
transferee would be in violation of law; 
(E) the Secretary has approved the transfer under section 5812 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 5812]; or 
176 
F I R E A R M S 18 USCS § 922 
(F) on application of the transferor, the Secretary has certified that 
compliance with subparagraph (A)(i)(III) is impracticable because— 
(i) the ratio of the number of law enforcement officers of the State 
in which the transfer is to occur to the number of square miles of 
land area of the State does not exceed 0.0025; 
(ii) the business premises of the transferor at which the transfer is to 
occur are extremely remote in relation to the chief law enforcement 
officer; and 
(iii) there is an absence of telecommunications facilities in the 
geographical area in which the business premises are located. 
(2) A chief law enforcement officer to whom a transferor has provided 
notice pursuant to paragraph (l)(A)(i)(III) shall make a reasonable effort 
to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession would 
be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local 
recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated 
by the Attorney General. 
(3) The statement referred to in paragraph (l)(A)(i)(I) shall contain 
only— 
(A) the name, address, and date of birth appearing on a valid identifica-
tion document (as defined in section 1028(d)(1)) of the transferee 
containing a photograph of the transferee and a description of the 
identification used; 
(B) a statement that the transferee— 
(i) is not under indictment for, and has not been convicted in any 
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
1 year, 
(ii) is not a fugitive from justice; 
(iii) is not an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance 
(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 USCS 
§ 802J); 
(iv) has not been adjudicated as a mental defective or been commit-
ted to a mental institution; 
(v) is not an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vi) has not been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; and 
(vii) is not a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship; 
(C) the date the statement is made; and 
(D) notice that the transferee intends to obtain a handgun from the 
transferor. 
(4) Any transferor of a handgun who, after such transfer, receives a report 
from a chief law enforcement officer containing information that receipt 
or possession of the handgun by the transferee violates Federal, State, or 
local law shall, within 1 business day after receipt of such request, com-
municate any information related to the transfer that the transferor has 
about the transfer and the transferee to— 
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(A) the chief law enforcement officer of the place of business of the 
transferor; and 
(B) the chief law enforcement officer of the place of residence of the 
transferee. 
(5) Any transferor who receives information, not otherwise available to 
the public, in a report under this subsection shall not disclose such infor-
mation except to the transferee, to law enforcement authorities, or pursu-
ant to the direction of a court of law. 
(6)( A) Any transferor who sells, delivers, or otherwise transfers a handgun 
to a transferee shall retain the copy of the statement of the transferee 
with respect to the handgun transaction, and shall retain evidence that 
the transferor has complied with subclauses (III) and (IV) of paragraph 
(l)(A)(i) with respect to the statement. 
(B) Unless the chief law enforcement officer to whom a statement is 
transmitted under paragraph (l)(A)(i)(IV) determines that a transac-
tion would violate Federal, State, or local law— 
(i) the officer shall, within 20 business days after the date the 
transferee made the statement on the basis of which the notice was 
provided, destroy the statement, any record containing information 
derived from the statement, and any record created as a result of the 
notice required by paragraph (l)(A)(i)(III); 
(ii) the information contained in the statement shall not be conveyed 
to any person except a person who has a need to know in order to 
carry out this subsection; and 
(iii) the information contained in the statement shall not be used for 
any purpose other than to carry out this subsection. 
(C) If a chief law enforcement officer determines that an individual is 
ineligible to receive a handgun and the individual requests the officer to 
provide the reason for such determination, the officer shall provide such 
reasons to the individual in writing within 20 business days after receipt 
of the request. 
(7) A chief law enforcement officer or other person responsible for provid-
ing criminal history background information pursuant to this subsection 
shall not be liable in an action at law for damages— 
(A) for failure to prevent the sale or transfer of a handgun to a person 
whose receipt or possession of the handgun is unlawful under this sec-
tion; or 
(B) for preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may lawfully 
receive or possess a handgun. 
(8) For purposes of this subsection, the term "chief law enforcement of-
ficer" means the chief of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer or the 
designee of any such individual. 
(9) The Secretary shall take necessary actions to ensure that the provi-
sions of this subsection are published and disseminated to licensed deal-
ers, law enforcement officials, and the public. 
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fies licensees under section 103(d) of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act [note to this section] that the national instant criminal 
background check system is established, a licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, or licensed dealer shall not transfer a firearm to any other 
person who is not licensed under this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.J, 
unless— 
(A) before the completion of the transfer, the licensee contacts the 
national instant criminal background check system established under 
section 103 of that Act [note to this section); 
(B)(i) the system provides the licensee with a unique identification 
number; or 
(ii) 3 business days (meaning a day on which State offices are open) 
have elapsed since the licensee contacted the system, and the system 
has not notified the licensee that the receipt of a firearm by such 
other person would violate subsection (g) or (n) of this section; and 
(C) the transferor has verified the identity of the transferee by examin-
ing a valid identification document (as defined in section 1028(d)(1) of 
this title) of the transferee containing a photograph of the transferee. 
(2) If receipt of a firearm would not violate section 922(g) or (n) or State 
law, the system shall— 
(A) assign a unique identification number to the transfer, 
(B) provide the licensee with the number, and 
(C) destroy all records of the system with respect to the call (other than 
the identifying number and the date the number was assigned) and all 
records of the system relating to the person or the transfer. 
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a firearm transfer between a licensee 
and another person if— 
(A)(i) such other person has presented to the licensee a permit that— 
(I) allows such other person to possess or acquire a firearm; and 
(II) was issued not more than 5 years earlier by the State in which 
the transfer is to take place; and 
(ii) the law of the State provides that such a permit is to be issued 
only after an authorized government official has verified that the in-
formation available to such official does not indicate that possession 
of a firearm by such other person would be in violation of law; 
(B) the Secretary has approved the transfer under section 5812 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 5812); or 
(C) on application of the transferor, the Secretary has certified that 
compliance with paragraph (1)(A) is impracticable because— 
(i) the ratio of the number of law enforcement officers of the State 
in which the transfer is to occur to the number of square miles of 
land area of the State does not exceed 0.0025; 
(ii) the business premises of the licensee at which the transfer is to 
occur are extremely remote in relation to the chief law enforcement 
officer (as defined in subsection (s)(8)); and 
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(iii) there is an absence of telecommunications facilities in the 
geographical area in which the business premises are located. 
(4) If the national instant criminal background check system notifies the 
licensee that the information available to the system does not demonstrate 
that the receipt of a firearm by such other person would violate subsec-
tion (g) or (n) or State law, and the licensee transfers a firearm to such 
other person, the licensee shall include in the record of the transfer the 
unique identification number provided by the system with respect to the 
transfer. 
(5) If the licensee knowingly transfers a firearm to such other person and 
knowingly fails to comply with paragraph (1) of this subsection with re-
spect to the transfer and, at the time such other person most recently 
proposed the transfer, the national instant criminal background check 
system was operating and information was available to the system dem-
onstrating that receipt of a firearm by such other person would violate 
subsection (g) or (n) of this section or State law, the Secretary may, after 
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend for not more than 6 months 
or revoke any license issued to the licensee under section 923, and may 
impose on the licensee a civil fine of not more than $5,000. 
(6) Neither a local government nor an employee of the Federal Govern-
ment or of any State or local government, responsible for providing infor-
mation to the national instant criminal background check system shall be 
liable in an action at law for damages— 
(A) for failure to prevent the sale or transfer of a firearm to a person 
whose receipt or possession of the firearm is unlawful under this sec-
tion; or 
(B) for preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may lawfully 
receive or possess a firearm. 
(u) It shall be unlawful for a person to steal or unlawfully take or carry away 
from the person or the premises of a person who is licensed to engage in the 
business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, any firearm in 
the licensee's business inventory that has been shipped or transported in in-
terstate or foreign commerce. 
(v)(I) It shall be unlawful for a person to manufacture, transfer, or possess 
a semiautomatic assault weapon. 
(2) Paragraph (I) shall not apply to the possession or transfer of any 
semiautomatic assault weapon otherwise lawfully possessed under Federal 
law on the date of the enactment of this subsection [enacted Sept. 13, 
1994). 
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to— 
(A) any of the firearms, or replicas or duplicates of the firearms, speci-
fied in Appendix A to this section, as such firearms were manufactured 
on October I, 1993; 
(B) any firearm that— 
(i) is manually operated by bolt, pump, lever, or slide action; 
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(ii) has been rendered permanently inoperable; or 
(iii) is an antique firearm; 
(C) any semiautomatic rifle that cannot accept a detachable magazine 
that holds more than 5 rounds of ammunition; or 
(D) any semiautomatic shotgun that cannot hold more than 5 rounds 
of ammunition in a fixed or detachable magazine. 
The fact that a firearm is not listed in Appendix A shall not be construed 
to mean that paragraph (1) applies to such firearm. No firearm exempted 
by this subsection may be deleted from Appendix A so long as this subsec-
tion is in effect. 
(4) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to— 
(A) the manufacture for, transfer to, or possession by the United States 
or a department or agency of the United States or a State or a depart-
ment, agency, or political subdivision of a State, or a transfer to or 
possession by a law enforcement officer employed by such an entity for 
purposes of law enforcement (whether on or off duty); 
(B) the transfer to a licensee under title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 [42 USCS §§ 2011 et seq.] for purposes of establishing and 
maintaining an on-site physical protection system and security organi-
zation required by Federal law, or possession by an employee or 
contractor of such licensee on-site for such purposes or off-site for 
purposes of licensee-authorized training or transportation of nuclear 
materials; 
(C) the possession, by an individual who is retired from service with a 
law enforcement agency and is not otherwise prohibited from receiving 
a firearm, of a semiautomatic assault weapon transferred to the individ-
ual by the agency upon such retirement; or 
(D) the manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic assault 
weapon by a licensed manufacturer or licensed importer for the 
purposes of testing or experimentation authorized by the Secretary. 
(w)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for a person 
to transfer or possess a large capacity ammunition feeding device. 
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the possession or transfer of any large 
capacity ammunition feeding device otherwise lawfully possessed on or 
before the date of the enactment of this subsection [enacted Sept. 13, 
1994]. 
(3) This subsection shall not apply to— 
(A) the manufacture for, transfer to, or possession by the United States 
or a department or agency of the United States or a State or a depart-
ment, agency, or political subdivision of a State, or a transfer to or 
possession by a law enforcement officer employed by such an entity for 
purposes of law enforcement (whether on or off duty); 
(B) the transfer to a licensee under title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 [42 USCS §§2011 et seq.] for purposes of establishing and 
maintaining an on-site physical protection system and security organi-
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zation required by Federal law, or possession by an employee or 
contractor of such licensee on-site for such purposes or off-site for 
purposes of licensee-authorized training or transportation of nuclear 
materials; 
(C) the possession, by an individual who is retired from service with a 
law enforcement agency and is not otherwise prohibited from receiving 
ammunition, of a large capacity ammunition feeding device transferred 
to the individual by the agency upon such retirement; or 
(D) the manufacture, transfer, or possession of any large capacity am-
munition feeding device by a licensed manufacturer or licensed im-
porter for the purposes of testing or experimentation authorized by the 
Secretary. 
(4) If a person charged with violating paragraph (1) asserts that paragraph 
(I) does not apply to such person because of paragraph (2) or (3), the 
Government shall have the burden of proof to show that such paragraph 
(1) applies to such person. The lack of a serial number as described in 
section 923(i) of title 18, United States Code, shall be a presumption that 
the large capacity ammunition feeding device is not subject to the prohi-
bition of possession in paragraph (1). 
0(1) It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer 
to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
is a juvenile— 
(A) a handgun; or 
(B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly 
possess— 
(A) a handgun; or 
(B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun. 
(3) This subsection does not apply to— 
(A) a temporary transfer of a handgun or ammunition to a juvenile or 
to the possession or use of a handgun or ammunition by a juvenile if 
the handgun and ammunition are possessed and used by the juvenile— 
(i) in the course of employment, in the course of ranching or farm-
ing related to activities at the residence of the juvenile (or on prop-
erty used for ranching or farming at which the juvenile, with the 
permission of the property owner or lessee, is performing activities 
related to the operation of the farm or ranch), target practice, hunt-
ing, or a course of instruction in the safe and lawful use of a 
handgun; 
(ii) with the prior written consent of the juvenile's parent or guard-
ian who is not prohibited by Federal, State, or local law from pos-
sessing a firearm, except— 
(I) during transportation by the juvenile of an unloaded handgun 
in a locked container directly from the place of transfer to a place 
at which an activity described in clause (i) is to take place and 
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transportation by the juvenile of that handgun, unloaded and in a 
locked container, directly from the place at which such an activ-
ity took place to the transferor; or 
(II) with respect to ranching or farming activities as described in 
clause (i), a juvenile may possess and use a handgun or ammuni-
tion with the prior written approval of the juvenile's parent or 
legal guardian and at the direction of an adult who is not 
prohibited by Federal, State or local law from possessing a 
firearm; 
(iii) the juvenile has the prior written consent in the juvenile's pos-
session at all times when a handgun is in the possession of the juve-
nile; and 
(iv) in accordance with State and local law; 
(B) a juvenile who is a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
States or the National Guard who possesses or is armed with a handgun 
in the line of duty; 
(C) a transfer by inheritance of title (but not possession) of a handgun 
or ammunition to a juvenile; or 
(D) the possession of a handgun or ammunition by a juvenile taken in 
defense of the juvenile or other persons against an intruder into the 
residence of the juvenile or a residence in which the juvenile is an 
invited guest. 
(4) A handgun or ammunition, the possession of which is transferred to a 
juvenile in circumstances in which the transferor is not in violation of this 
subsection shall not be subject to permanent confiscation by the Govern-
ment if its possession by the juvenile subsequently becomes unlawful 
because of the conduct of the juvenile, but shall be returned to the lawful 
owner when such handgun or ammunition is no longer required by the 
Government for the purposes of investigation or prosecution. 
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term "juvenile" means a person 
' who is less than 18 years of age. 
(6)(A) In a prosecution of a violation of this subsection, the court shall 
require the presence of a juvenile defendant's parent or legal guardian 
at all proceedings. 
(B) The court may use the contempt power to enforce subparagraph 
(A). 
(C) The court may excuse attendance of a parent or legal guardian of 
a juvenile defendant at a proceeding in a prosecution of a violation of 
this subsection for good cause shown. 
